![]() Originating from DIA headquarters and various overseas missions, the cables should be ![]() Intelligence as well as those who analyzed the data in Washington. This selection of 25 reports and analyses covers a range of security-related topics that were the typical focus of the DIA officers who collected the Li Peng, China's premier, declared martial law on May 20, 1989, in response to growing protests in Tiananmen Square (photo credit: World Economic Forum). As one report ( Document 12) points out, "reluctance" does not always mean "disobedience." At the same time, the records implicitly show that a more nuanced take on the issue is That viewpoint finds further support in the cables published today. ![]() More recently, an account in The New York Times, īased on interviews, leaked Chinese records and recent scholarship, essentially draws the same conclusion as the CIA analysis of 25 years ago but withĬonsiderable evidence that both senior officers and rank-and-file soldiers had basic qualms about confronting their fellow citizens with lethal force. Purported to show a much more limited split - one that existed "only at the top," and did not reach throughout the system. In January 2001, The Tiananmen Papers, a collection of secret documents smuggled out of the Chinese archives, was published in the West and A CIA assessment from August that year described some high-ranking officers asīeing opposed to bloody force on principle while others were suspicious that hardliners were secretly planning a coup against party leader Zhao Ziyang (see Secret US intelligence analyses concluded significant divisions existed. The question of whether China's ruling Communist authorities were united in ordering a bloody crackdown on student protests has been debated since 1989. Fears of "counterrevolutionary" retaliation abounded, including concerns that Chinese passengers planes might be bombed ( Document 11)įormer Chinese Party leader Hu Yaobang shortly before his death in April 1989, an event which touched off the massive protests at Tiananmen Square.Public reaction to the violence included a run on the Shanghai branch of the Bank of China that required the Army to airlift large quantities ofįoreign currency to meet demand ( Document 20) Arrests of student protesters continued for months, to the point where the capital reportedly ran out of prison space for them ( Document 19).Some reports indicated military forces brought in from outside Beijing were spotted "laughing" and "shooting at random" at civilians ( Document 9).Risking their own lives, pedicab drivers - hailed by one source as "the real heroes" - were critical to the effort to get the wounded and dead to.Facing a "continuous stream of victims," doctors at a central Beijing hospital refused to turn over corpses to security officers when theyĭiscovered the bodies were being cremated before they could be identified ( Document 17).True, a DIA cable noted that at a minimum there was "great chaos among the high-level military leadership" ( Document 4) In the heat of the moment, rumors flew, including that paramount leader Deng Xiaoping had died (he lived until 1997) without accepting the rumor as Nevertheless, these depictions effectively convey some of the great drama "Each day everyone seems to have a new horror story about China" ( Document 11). (The localĪttachés are careful to note that the reports they are receiving are "not finally evaluated intelligence." In fact, at one point an author comments: Īmong the highlights of the DIA reporting cables are the following vivid accounts of events on the ground in Beijing during and after June 1989. The Archive obtained the documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). (DIA) records relating to the event and its aftermath. Marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the crushing of the Tiananmen protests, the National Security Archive is posting 25 Defense Intelligence Agency ![]() The political longevity of the Chinese leadership. Declassified reports citing well-placed sources inside China describe sharpĭifferences among some of the country's military and political elite, as well as a range of other security-related concerns with important implications for Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, according to US military intelligence. Significant cleavages existed within the Chinese political leadership and security apparatus over the decision to use force against student protesters at Deng Xiaoping, China's paramount leader from 1978-1992 (photo credit: Carter White House Photographs Collection). ![]()
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